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    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
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                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    --------
                                   No. 91-1618
                                    --------

                     GEORGE VOINOVICH, GOVERNOR OF OHIO, ET
                       AL., APPELLANTS v. BARNEY QUILTER,                                      ____
                                     SPEAKER
                          PRO TEMPORE OF OHIO HOUSE OF
                             REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL.

                        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
                    DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
                                     OF OHIO

                                 [March 2, 1993]

  JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

  This is yet another dispute arising out of legislative redistricting and
reapportionment.  See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. --- (1993).  Today we                       ____                          _  _____    ______
consider whether Ohio's creation of several legislative districts dominated by
minority voters violated S2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. S1973.

                                        I

  Under the Ohio Constitution, the state apportionment board must reapportion
electoral districts for the state legislature every 10 years.  Ohio Const., Art.
XI, S1.  In 1991, the board selected James Tilling to draft a proposed
apportionment plan.  After conducting public hearings and meeting with members
of historically underrepresented groups, Tilling drafted a plan that included
eight so-called majority-minority districts - districts in which a majority of
the population is a member of a specific minority group.  The board adopted the
plan with minor amendments by a 3-to-2 vote along party lines.  The board's
three Republican members voted for the plan; the two Democrats voted against it.
794 F. Supp. 695, 698, 716-717 (ND Ohio                                 91-1618 - OPINION

2                             VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

1992); App. to Juris. Statement 160a-167a, 183a.
  Appellees Barney Quilter and Thomas Ferguson, the two Democratic members of
the Board who voted against the plan, and various Democratic electors and
legislators filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio seeking the plan's invalidation.  They alleged that
the plan violated S2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
S1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  794 F. Supp., at 695-696.  According to appellees, the plan
"packed" black voters by creating districts in which they would constitute a
disproportionately large majority.  This, appellees contended, minimized the
total number of districts in which black voters could select their candidate of
choice.  In appellees' view, the plan should have created a larger number of
"influence" districts - districts in which black voters would not constitute a
majority but in which they could, with the help of a predictable number of
cross-over votes from white voters, elect their candidates of choice.  See App.
to Juris. Statement 141a-142a.  Appellants, by contrast, argued that the plan
actually enhanced the strength of black voters by providing "safe" minority-
dominated districts.  The plan, they pointed out, compared favorably with the
1981 apportionment and had the backing of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Ohio Conference of Branches (Ohio NAACP).  794 F.
Supp., at 706.
  A three-judge District Court heard the case and held for appellees.  Relying
on various statements Tilling had made in the course of the reapportionment
hearings, the court found that the board had created minority-dominated
districts "whenever possible."  Id., at 698.  The District Court rejected                                ____
appellants' contention that S2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42
U. S. C. S1973, requires that such districts be created wherever possible.
Id., at 699.  It further held that S2 actually prohibits the____                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                             3                                       ____

"wholesale creation of majority-minority districts" unless necessary to
"`remedy' " a S2 violation.  Id., at 701.  The District Court therefore ordered                             ___
the board to draft a new plan or demonstrate that it was remedying a S2
violation.  Id., at 702.            ___
  Judge Dowd dissented, arguing that the majority's analysis "place[d] the cart
before the horse."  Id., at 709.  In his view, S2 does not require the State to                    ___
show a violation before creating a majority-minority district.  Rather, the
State may create any district it might desire, so long as minority voting
strength is not diluted as a result.  Because appellees failed to demonstrate
that the 1991 plan diluted the balloting strength of black voters, Judge Dowd
thought their challenge should fail.  Id., at 710.                                      ___
  The apportionment board responded by creating a record that, in its view,
justified the creation of majority-minority districts.  The board also adjusted
the plan to correct "technical" errors that the Ohio Supreme Court had identi-
fied in its independent review of the plan.  This revised 1992 plan created only
five majority-black districts.  App. to Juris. Statement 258a-263a. The District
Court, however, was not satisfied with the board's proof.  In an order issued on
March 10, 1992, it held that "the [b]oard fail[ed] once again to justify its
wholesale creation of majority-minority districts, thus rendering the plan, as
submitted, violative of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."  794 F. Supp. 756, 757
(ND Ohio).  The court then appointed a special master to prepare a redistricting
plan.  Ibid.  Once again, Judge Dowd dissented.  Id., at 758.       _____                                     ___
  Nine days later, on March 19, 1992, the District Court issued an order
reaffirming its view that the creation of majority-minority districts is
impermissible under S2 unless necessary to remedy a statutory violation.  App.
to Juris. Statement 128a-141a.  The order also restated the court's conclusion
that the board had failed to prove a violation.  Specifically, it noted "the
absence of racial bloc                                91-1618 - OPINION

4                             VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

voting, the [ability of black voters] to elect both black and white candidates
of their choice, and the fact that such candidates ha[d] been elected over a
sustained period of time."  Id., at 130a.  In addition, the order rejected as                            ___
"clever sophistry" appellants' argument that the District Court should not have
invalidated the 1991 plan without finding that, under the totality of the
circumstances, it diluted minority voting strength:

   "Having implemented the Voting Rights Act remedy in the absence of a
   violation, [appellants] suggest that we are now required to establish a
   violation as a prerequisite to removing the remedy.  Actually, however, this
   task is not as difficult as it seems.  The totality of circumstances reveals
   coalitional voting between whites and blacks.  As a result, black candidates
   have been repeatedly elected from districts with only a 35% black population.
   Against this background, the per se requirement of the creation of majority-
   minority districts has a dilutive effect on black votes . . . ."  Id., at                                                                     ___
   141a, 142a (footnotes omitted).

The District Court further concluded that, because the board had applied the
"`remedy' intentionally" and for the purpose of political advantage, it had
violated not only S2 but the Fifteenth Amendment as well.  Id., at 142a-143a.                                                            ___
Finally, the court held that the plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
it departed from the requirement that all districts be of nearly equal
population.  Id., at 146a-148a.             ___
  On March 31, 1992, the District Court ordered that the primary elections for
Ohio's General Assembly be rescheduled.  794 F. Supp. 760 (ND Ohio).  On April
20, 1992, this Court granted appellants' application for a stay of the District
Court's orders, 503 U. S. ---; and on June 1, 1992, we noted probable
jurisdiction, 504 U. S. ---.  We now reverse the judgment of the District Court
and remand only for further proceedings on whether the plan's                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                             5                                       ____

deviation from equal population among districts violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.

                                       II
  Congress enacted S2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. S1973, to
help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that no citizen's right to
vote shall "be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude," U. S. Const., Amdt. 15.  See NAACP v. New York, 413                                                      _____    ________
U. S. 345, 350 (1973).  Section 2(a) of the Act prohibits the imposition of any
electoral practice or procedure that "results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color."  Section 2(b),
in relevant part, specifies that S2(a) is violated if:
   "[B]ased on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
   processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
   subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
   citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have
   less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
   political process and to elect representatives of their choice."  42 U. S. C.
   S1973(b).

Section 2 thus prohibits any practice or procedure that, "interact[ing] with
social and historical conditions," impairs the ability of a protected class to
elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters.  Thornburg v.                                                                    _________
Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 47 (1986)._______

                                        A
  In the context of single-member districts, the usual device for diluting
minority voting power is the manipulation of district lines.  A politically
cohesive minority group that is large enough to constitute the majority in                                91-1618 - OPINION

6                             VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

a single-member district has a good chance of electing its candidate of choice,
if the group is placed in a district where it constitutes a majority.  Dividing
the minority group among various districts so that it is a majority in none may
prevent the group from electing its candidate of choice: If the majority in each
district votes as a bloc against the minority candidate, the fragmented minority
group will be unable to muster sufficient votes in any district to carry its
candidate to victory.
  This case focuses not on the fragmentation of a minority group among various
districts but on the concentration of minority voters within a district.  How
such concentration or "packing" may dilute minority voting strength is not
difficult to conceptualize.  A minority group, for example, might have
sufficient numbers to constitute a majority in three districts.  So apportioned,
the group inevitably will elect three candidates of its choice, assuming the
group is sufficiently cohesive.  But if the group is packed into two districts
in which it constitutes a super-majority, it will be assured only two
candidates.  As a result, we have recognized that "[d]ilution of racial minority
group voting strength may be caused" either "by the dispersal of blacks into
districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or from the
concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute an excessive
majority."  Id., at 46, n. 11.            ____
  Appellees in this case, however, do not allege that Ohio's creation of
majority-black districts prevented black voters from constituting a majority in                                                                    ________
additional districts.  Instead, they claim that Ohio's plan deprived them of
"influence districts" in which they would have constituted an influential
minority.  Black voters in such influence districts, of course, could not________
dictate electoral outcomes independently.  But they could elect their candidate
of choice nonetheless if they are numerous enough and their candidate attracts
sufficient cross-over votes from white voters.  We have not yet decided whether
influence-                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                             7                                       ____

dilution claims such as appellees' are viable under S2, Growe, 507 U. S., at                                                        _____
---, n. 5 (slip op., at 15, n. 5); see Gingles, supra, at 46-47, nn. 11-12                                       _______  _____
(leaving open the possibility of influence-dilution claims); nor do we decide
that question today.  Instead, we assume for the purpose of resolving this case
that appellees in fact have stated a cognizable S2 claim.
                                        B
  The practice challenged here, the creation of majority-minority districts,
does not invariably minimize or maximize minority voting strength.  Instead, it
can have either effect or neither.  On the one hand, creating majority-black
districts necessarily leaves fewer black voters and therefore diminishes black-
voter influence in predominantly white districts.  On the other hand, the
creation of majority-black districts can enhance the influence of black voters.
Placing black voters in a district in which they constitute a sizeable and
therefore "safe" majority ensures that they are able to elect their candidate of
choice.  Which effect the practice has, if any at all, depends entirely on the
facts and circumstances of each case.
  The District Court, however, initially thought it unnecessary to determine the
effect of creating majority-black districts under the totality of the
circumstances.  In fact, the court did not believe it necessary to find vote
dilution at all.  It instead held that S2 prohibits the creation of majority-
minority districts unless such districts are necessary to remedy a statutory
violation.  794 F. Supp., at 701.  We disagree.  Section 2 contains no per se                                                                       ______
prohibitions against particular types of districts: It says nothing about
majority-minority districts, districts dominated by certain political parties,
or even districts based entirely on partisan political concerns.  Instead, S2
focuses exclusively on the consequences of apportionment.  Only if the
apportionment scheme has the effect of denying a protected class the equal                             ______
opportunity to elect                                91-1618 - OPINION

8                             VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

its candidate of choice does it violate S2; where such an effect has not been
demonstrated, S2 simply does not speak to the matter.   See 42 U. S. C.
S1973(b).  Indeed, in Gingles we expressly so held: "[E]lectoral devices . . .                      _______
may not be considered per se violative of S2.  Plaintiffs must demonstrate                      ______
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal
access to the electoral process."  478 U. S., at 46.  As a result, the District
Court was required to determine the consequences of Ohio's apportionment plan
before ruling on its validity; the failure to do so was error.
  The District Court's decision was flawed for another reason as well.  By
requiring appellants to justify the creation of majority-minority districts, the
District Court placed the burden of justifying apportionment on the State.
Section 2, however, places at least the initial burden of proving an
apportionment's invalidity squarely on the plaintiff's shoulders.  Section 2(b)
specifies that S2(a) is violated if "it is shown" that a state practice has the                                     ___________
effect of denying a protected group equal access to the electoral process.  42
U. S. C. S1973(b) (emphasis added).  The burden of "show[ing]" the prohibited
effect, of course, is on the plaintiff; surely Congress could not have intended
the State to prove the invalidity of its own apportionment scheme.  See Gingles,                                                                        _______
478 U. S., at 46 (plaintiffs must demonstrate that the device results in unequal
access to the electoral process); id., at 49 n. 15 (plaintiffs must "prove their                                  ___
claim before they may be awarded relief").  The District Court relieved
appellees of that burden in this case solely because the State had created
majority-minority districts.  Because that departure from the statutorily
required allocation of burdens finds no support in the statute, it was error for
the District Court to impose it.
  Of course, the federal courts may not order the creation of majority-minority
districts unless necessary to remedy a violation of federal law.  See Growe,                                                                      ______
supra, at --- (slip______                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                             9                                       ____

op., at 15).  But that does not mean that the State's powers are similarly
limited.  Quite the opposite is true: Federal courts are barred from intervening
in state apportionment in the absence of a violation of federal law precisely
because it is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct
apportionment in the first place.  Time and again we have emphasized that
"`reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through
its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court.'"  Growe, supra,                                                                  _____  _____
at ---  (slip op., at 8) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27 (1975)).                                   _______    _____
Accord, Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 414 (1977) ("We have repeatedly empha-        ______    _____
sized that `legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative
consideration and determination'" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 586                                           ________    ____
(1964)).  Because the "States do not derive their reapportionment authority from
the Voting Rights Act, but rather from independent provisions of state and
federal law," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12, the federal courts                                         _____________
are bound to respect the States' apportionment choices unless those choices
contravene federal requirements.  Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641,                                      __________    ______
647-648 (1966) ("Under the distribution of powers effected by the Constitution,
the States establish qualifications for voting for state officers" and such
qualifications are valid unless they violate the Constitution or a federal
statute).
  Appellees' complaint does not allege that the State's conscious use of race in
redistricting violates the Equal Protection Clause; the District Court below did
not address the issue; and neither party raises it here.  Accordingly, we
express no view on how such a claim might be evaluated.  We hold only that,
under S2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U. S. C. S 1973,
plaintiffs can prevail on a dilution claim only if they show that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the State's apportionment scheme has the effect
of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of the                                91-1618 - OPINION

10                            VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

protected class.

                                        C
  In its order of March 19, 1992, the District Court found that the 1992 plan's
creation of majority-minority districts "ha[d] a dilutive effect on black
votes."  App. to Juris. Statement 141a.  Again we disagree.
  In Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, this Court held that plaintiffs claiming vote     _________    _______________
dilution through the use of multimember districts must prove three threshold
conditions.  First, they must show that the minority group "`is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district.'"  Second, they must prove that the minority group " `is politically
cohesive.'"  Third, the plaintiffs must establish " `that the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate.'"  Growe, 507 U. S., at --- (slip op., at 14) (quoting                        _____
Gingles, supra,  at 50-51).  The District Court apparently thought the three_______________
Gingles factors inapplicable because Ohio has single-member rather than_______
multimember districts.  794 F. Supp., at 699 ("Gingles' preconditions are not                                               _______
applicable to the apportionment of single-member districts").  In Growe,                                                                  _____
however, we held that the Gingles preconditions apply in challenges to single-                          _______
member as well as multimember districts.  507 U. S., at --- (slip op., at
14-15).
  Had the District Court employed the Gingles test in this case, it would have                                      _______
rejected appellees' S2 claim.  Of course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied                                              _______
mechanically and without regard to the nature of the claim.  For example, the
first Gingles precondition, the requirement that the group be sufficiently large      _______
to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to be modified or
eliminated when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume arguendo to be                                                                 ________
actionable today.  Supra, at 7.  The complaint in such a case is not that black                   _____
voters have                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                            11                                       ____

been deprived of the ability to constitute a majority, but of the possibility of                                             ________
being a sufficiently large minority to elect their candidate of choice with the                           ________
assistance of cross-over votes from the white majority.  See supra, at 6.  We                                                             _____
need not decide how Gingles' first factor might apply here, however, because                    _______
appellees have failed to demonstrate Gingles' third precondition - sufficient                                     _______
white majority bloc voting to frustrate the election of the minority group's
candidate of choice.  The District Court specifically found that Ohio does not
suffer from "racially polarized voting."  794 F. Supp., at 700-701.  Accord,
App. to Juris. Statement 132a-134a, and n. 2, 139a-140a.  Even appellees agree.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.  Here, as in Gingles, "in the absence of significant                                      _______
white bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect
their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters."  Gingles, 478                                                                    ________
U. S., at 49, n. 15.  The District Court's finding of a S2 violation,
therefore, must be reversed.

                                       III
  The District Court also held that the redistricting plan violated the
Fifteenth Amendment because the apportionment board intentionally diluted
minority voting strength for political reasons.  App. to Juris. Statement
142a-143a.  This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies
to vote-dilution claims; in fact, we never have held any legislative apportion-
ment inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.  Beer v. United States, 425                                                 ____    _____________
U. S. 130, 142-143, n. 14 (1976).  Nonetheless, we need not decide the precise
scope of the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition in this case.  Even if we assume
that the Fifteenth Amendment speaks to claims like respondents', the District
Court's decision still must be reversed: Its finding of intentional
discrimination was clearly erroneous.  See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 62                                           ______    ______
(1980) (plurality opinion); id., at 101-103 (WHITE, J., dissenting); id., at                            ___                                      ___
90-92 (STEVENS, J., concurring in                                91-1618 - OPINION

12                            VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

judgment); id., at 80 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in result).           ___
  The District Court cited only two pieces of evidence to support its finding.
First, the District Court thought it significant that the plan's drafter,
Tilling, disregarded the requirements of the Ohio Constitution where he believed
that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required a contrary result.  App. to Juris.
Statement 142a-143a, n. 8.  But Tilling's preference for federal over state law
when he believed the two in conflict does not raise an inference of intentional
discrimination; it demonstrates obedience to the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.  Second, the District Court cited Tilling's possession of
certain documents that, according to the court, were tantamount to "a road-map
detailing how [one could] create a racial gerrymander."  Id., at 143a, n. 9.                                                          __
Apparently, the District Court believed that Tilling, a Republican, sought to
minimize the Democratic Party's power by diluting minority voting strength.  See
ibid.  The District Court, however, failed to explain the nature of the_____
documents.  Contrary to the implication of the District Court opinion, the
documents were not a set of Republican plans for diluting minority voting
strength.  In fact, they were not even created by Tilling or the Republicans.
They were created by a Democrat who, concerned about possible Republican manipu-
lation of apportionment, set out the various types of political gerrymandering
in which he thought the Republicans might engage.  App. 99-100.  That Tilling
possessed documents in which the opposing party speculated that he might have a
discriminatory strategy does not indicate that Tilling actually had such a
strategy.  And nothing in the record indicates that Tilling relied on the
documents in preparing the plan.
  Indeed, the record demonstrates that Tilling and the board relied on sources
that were wholly unlikely to engage in or tolerate intentional discrimination
against black voters, including the Ohio NAACP, the Black                                91-1618 - OPINION

                              VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                            13                                       ____

Elected Democrats of Ohio, and the Black Elected Democrats of Cleveland, Ohio.
Tilling's plan actually incorporated much of the Ohio NAACP's proposed plan; the
Ohio NAACP, for its part, fully supported the 1991 apportionment plan.  794 F.
Supp., at 726-729; App. to Juris. Statement 164a-167a, 269a-270a.  Because the
evidence not only fails to support but also directly contradicts the District
Court's finding of discriminatory intent, we reverse that finding as clearly
erroneous.  In so doing, we express no view on the relationship between the
Fifteenth Amendment and race-conscious redistricting.  Cf. United Jewish                                                           _____________
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 155-165 (1977)____________________________________    _____
(plurality opinion).  Neither party asserts that the State's conscious use of
race by itself violates the Fifteenth Amendment.  Instead, they dispute whether
the District Court properly found that the State intentionally discriminated
against black voters.  On that question, we hold only that the District Court's
finding of discriminatory intent was clear error.

                                       IV
  Finally, the District Court held that the plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it created legislative districts of unequal size.  App. to
Juris. Statement at 146a-148a.  The Equal Protection Clause does require that
electoral districts be "of nearly equal population, so that each person's vote
may be given equal weight in the election of representatives."  Connor, 431                                                                ______
U. S., at 416.  But the requirement is not an inflexible one.

   "[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative
   districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious
   discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification
   by the State.  Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an
   apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within                                91-1618 - OPINION

14                            VOINOVICH v. QUILTER                                       ____

   this category of minor deviations.  A plan with larger disparities in
   population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and
   therefore must be justified by the State."  Brown v. Thomson, 462 U. S. 835,                                               _____    _______
   842-843 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the District Court found that the maximum total deviation from ideal
district size exceeded 10%.  App. to Juris. Statement 148a.  As a result,
appellees established a prima facie case of discrimination, and appellants were
required to justify the deviation.  Appellants attempted to do just that,
arguing that the deviation resulted from the State's constitutional policy in
favor of preserving county boundaries.  See Ohio Const., Arts. VII-XI.  The
District Court therefore was required to decide whether the "plan `may
reasonably be said to advance [the] rational state policy'" of preserving
county boundaries "and, if so, `whether the population disparities among the
districts that have resulted from the pursuit of th[e] plan exceed constitu-
tional limits.'"  Brown, supra, at 843 (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315,                  _____  _____                  _____    ______
328 (1973)).  Rather than undertaking that inquiry, the District Court simply
held that total deviations in excess of 10% cannot be justified by a policy of
preserving the boundaries of political subdivisions.  Our case law is directly
to the contrary.  See Mahan v. Howell, supra  (upholding total deviation of over                      _____    _____________
16% where justified by the rational objective of preserving the integrity of
political subdivision lines); see also Brown v. Thomson, supra.  On remand, the                                       _____    _______________
District Court should consider whether the deviations from the ideal district
size are justified using the analysis employed in Brown, supra, at 843-846, and                                                  _____  _____
Mahan, supra, at 325-330._____  _____
  The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
                                                                     So ordered.                                                                     __________